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Abstract
This paper oﬀers an explanation for observed diﬀerences across countries in educational
policies and in resulting interpersonal distributions of human capital. We analyse a general-
equilibrium model in which, as a result of the apportionment of natural ability, nurturing, and
publicly ﬁnanced education, some people can be well endowed with human capital, whereas
other people are poorly endowed with human capital. We assume that people can choose to be
either producers or predators. Because an increase in a person’s human capital makes preda-
tion a less attractive choice for that person, it is possible that by using some of their human
capital to educate the poorly endowed people the well endowed people can increase their own
consumption. More interestingly, our theory predicts that, if producers are able to enforce a
collective choice that takes advantage of the deterrent eﬀect of allocating resources to guard-
ing against predators, then the well endowed people prefer a relatively egalitarian educational
policy that increases the human capital of all of the poorly endowed people. Such an educa-
tional policy either decreases the cost of deterring predation or makes deterrence possible. In
contrast, if producers or small subsets of producers individually choose the amount of their
resources to allocate to guarding, taking the ratio of predators to producers as given, then
the well endowed people prefer an elitist educational policy that, if it has a redistributional
component, decreases the number of poorly endowed people, thereby decreasing the number
of predators, without increasing the human capital of the remaining poorly endowed people.
These implications seem to be consistent with the facts about diﬀerences across countries in
educational policy.
We acknowledge helpful comments from Murat Iyigun, Juan Mendoza, and Suk Jae Noh.
Arse`ne Aka gave us valuable assistance with the data.
Mr. Benson looks to the future and sees a widening social abyss. “We could
get to a situation similar to Manila, where the upper and middle classes sur-
round themselves with walls and security guards to protect themselves from an
abandoned underclass.” . . . When asked about Mr. Benson’s fear of an urban
America that looks like Manila, Mr. Newsome shrugs: “It’s already like that,”
he says. (The Wall Street Journal, September 26, 1995, page A8.)
Although almost every modern state provides either public education or public subsi-
dies for education, casual observation reveals that diﬀerences in educational policy result in
large diﬀerences across countries in the interpersonal distribution of human capital. Most
notably, in Western European countries and in some East Asian countries, like Japan, Ko-
rea, Singapore, and Taiwan, every person receives a good enough education to insure that
almost everyone is at least functionally literate. In these countries the resulting distribution
of human capital is relatively egalitarian. In contrast, in many of the countries of South
America, Africa, and Asia, including the Philippines, and, as Mr. Newsome suggests, also in
the United States, educational policy is elitist. In these countries, while many people receive
higher education and acquire a large amount of human capital, many other people receive
little or no eﬀective education and do not even achieve functional literacy. These people
constitute “an abandoned underclass” to which Mr. Benson refers.
This paper proposes a positive theory of the redistributional component of publicly ﬁ-
nanced education. The theory suggests an explanation for why educational policy is egali-
tarian in some countries but elitist in other countries.
Our analytical framework is a general-equilibrium model in which, as a result of the ap-
portionment of natural ability, nurturing, and publicly ﬁnanced education, some people can
be well endowed with human capital, whereas other people are poorly endowed with human
capital. In this model the interpersonal distribution of human capital has two dimensions.
One dimension is the endowment of human capital of a poorly endowed person relative to a
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well endowed person. The other dimension is the fraction of people who are poorly endowed.
If educational policy has a redistributional component, then the well endowed are using
some of their human capital to educate people who, because of either modest natural ability
or ineﬀective nurturing or both, are initially poorly endowed with human capital. An egali-
tarian educational policy has a redistributional component that increases the human capital
of all of the poorly endowed people. An elitist educational policy, in contrast, may or may
not have a redistributional component. Also, if it has a redistributional component, then
an elitist educational policy only decreases the number of poorly endowed people without
increasing the human capital of the remaining poorly endowed people.
To theorize about educational policy we focus on the predatory threat posed by people
who are poorly endowed with human capital. To analyse this predatory threat we model
people as choosing to be either producers or predators, predators being people who produce
nothing, but live by appropriating the product of the producers.
We assume that each person chooses to be either a producer or a predator depending on
whether production or predation is more lucrative for him.1 We also assume that being a
predator is a more attractive choice for a poorly endowed person than for a well endowed
person. To implement this assumption as simply as possible, we specify technologies such
that a person’s human capital enhances his ability to produce, but does not enhance his
eﬀectiveness as a predator.2 Given these technologies, and given that human capital is
1Dan Usher (1987) developed a pioneering general-equilibrium model in which, as in the present model,
people choose whether to be producers or predators and producers decide how much time and eﬀort to put
into guarding against predators. In another paper — Grossman and Kim (2000) — we analyse the choices
of people to be producers or predators in a model in which only some people, whom we deﬁne to be amoral,
are potential predators. The other people, whom we deﬁne to be moral, always choose to be producers, no
matter how lucrative predation is relative to production. Usher (1997) assumes that education can increase
the fraction of people who are moral. In the present paper we assume that everybody is amoral. Assuming
that some people are moral would not change the main predictions about educational policy.
2This assumption implies that our analysis is applicable to low-skilled predatory activities like burglary,
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inalienable and can be neither directly consumed nor directly exchanged for consumables, a
person beneﬁts from a larger endowment of human capital only by choosing to be a producer.
The existence of poorly endowed people who might choose to be predators negatively
aﬀects the well endowed people in two ways: First, producers allocate some of their poten-
tially productive human capital to guarding against predators.3 Second, unless predation
is deterred, producers lose some of their production to predators. These negative eﬀects of
predation connect to educational policy because the well endowed people can mitigate the
threat of predation by using some of their human capital to educate those people who are
initially poorly endowed with human capital.4,5
robbery, and kidnapping. We implicitly abstract from high-skilled predatory activities like embezzlement
and some forms of litigation.
3Guarding against predators includes all actions that are costly but have the eﬀect of decreasing the
fraction of production lost to predation. Examples of ways of guarding against predators include the locating
of production in inconvenient but secure places, the production of things that are harder for predators to
appropriate, the installation of locks, the building of walls, the hiring of private security guards, and the
organizing of a police force. For simplicity, our analysis focuses only the total amount of resources allocated
to guarding, abstracting from diﬀerent ways of guarding. Further, although the model does not explicitly
consider the apprehension and punishment of predators, we could easily extend the analysis to allow for
apprehension and punishment. The apprehension and punishment of predators would not directly decrease
the ability of predators to appropriate the product of producers, but apprehension and punishment by
decreasing the expected utility of predators would make the choice to be a predator less attractive.
4We could apply a similar analysis to any redistributive policy from which a person can beneﬁt only by
choosing not to be a predator. For example, Grossman (1994) considered the possibility that the optimal
response of a propertied class to the threat of predation could be a redistribution of land, whereas Grossman
(1995) considered the possibility of a subsidy to wages to induce people to choose to be producers. Neither
of these earlier papers addressed the central issue in the present paper, which is the interaction between
guarding against predators and redistributive policy.
5Our model abstracts from externalities in production. As many authors have shown, such externalities
can induce well endowed people to subsidize the education of poorly endowed people, even in the absence of
a predatory threat. For example, Franc¸ois Bourguignon and Thierry Verdier (1996) emphasize production
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Our model assumes that the well endowed people make a collective choice of this redis-
tributional component of educational policy.6 In addition, our model allows the educational
policy that the well endowed people choose to be either egalitarian or elitist, or some com-
bination of egalitarian and elitist. An egalitarian educational policy makes production more
lucrative for all of the poorly endowed people, and thereby decreases the amount of guard-
ing against predators that is necessary to deter poorly endowed people from choosing to be
predators. An elitist educational policy, if it has a redistributional component, decreases
the number of people for whom predation is more lucrative than production, and thereby
decreases the number of people who choose to be predators.
In addition to distinguishing between countries with egalitarian and elitist educational
policies, we also distinguish countries in which the decision to allocate resources to guarding
against predators is made individually from countries in which this decision is made collec-
tively. In our theory an individual producer, or a small subset of producers, who chooses
the amount of his human capital to allocate to guarding takes the choices of other people to
be either predators or producers as given. In contrast, a collective choice of the amount of
guarding takes into account the deterrent eﬀect of guarding on the number of people who
choose to be predators.
Although this strategic advantage of a collective choice of the amount of guarding is
externalities in a model in which, in contrast to the present model, education enhances the ability of poorly
endowed people to pose a political threat to well endowed people. In the present model well endowed people
have an incentive to educate poorly endowed people only to mitigate the predatory threat from the poorly
endowed people. This simpliﬁcation focuses our analysis on explaining why educational policy is egalitarian
in some countries but elitist in other countries.
6We regard this view that donors take the initiative in redistributive policy to be both more general
and more realistic, even in ”democracies”, than the popular median-voter model of redistribution. Also,
we implicitly assume that the cost of receiving a publicly ﬁnanced education, which would include the
opportunity cost of time spent in school, is small enough that an initially poorly endowed person would
accept any oﬀer of publicly ﬁnanced education.
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important, the enforcement of collective choices is always problematic.7 In exploring the
eﬀect of the limited ability of producers to enforce a collective choice of the amount of
guarding, we consider three possible cases.
In the ﬁrst case, the limited ability of producers to enforce a collective choice of the
amount of guarding against predators does not impose a binding constraint. In the second
case, the limited ability of producers to enforce a collective choice of the amount of guarding
imposes a binding constraint, but with an appropriate redistributive educational policy this
constraint is not tight enough to negate the strategic advantage of collective choice. In the
third case, the producers’ ability to enforce a collective choice of the amount of guarding is so
limited that the strategic advantage of collective choice is lost. In this third case producers,
or small subsets of producers, individually choose the amount of guarding.
Casual observation suggests that Western European countries and some East Asian coun-
tries, like Japan, Korea, and Singapore, and Taiwan, provide historical examples in which
producers collectively choose the amount of guarding against predators. Interestingly, we
have already observed that these same countries have relatively egalitarian educational poli-
cies that provide even the poorly endowed with a relatively good education. In contrast,
other countries, mainly in South America, Africa, and Asia, including the Philippines and,
perhaps, also the United States, provide historical examples in which at the margin produc-
ers, or small subsets of producers, individually choose the amount of guarding. Even more
interestingly, we have observed that these countries have elitist educational policies that give
some people an excellent education and other people little or no education. These examples
suggest that egalitarian educational policies are associated with collective choice of guarding,
whereas elitist educational policies are associated with individual choice of guarding.
7To be more concrete, we can think of government as being the agent to whom producers assign the task
of enforcing a collective choice of the amount of guarding, with taxation being the means of enforcement. In
this context limited ability to enforce a collective choice of the amount of guarding reﬂects limited ability to
collect taxes from producers.
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To complement this anecdotal evidence we computed the following cross-country regres-
sions:
(I) hcsd = 0.66 + 0.28 ELF
(14.9) (3.3)
65 Observations R2 = 0.14 t-statistics in parentheses
(II) Q5/Q1 = 4.8 + 6.7 ELF + 20.0 AGR - 26.4 AGR2
(4.9) (2.0) (2.3) (-3.1)
73 Observations R2 = 0.11 t-statistics in parentheses
In regression (I) the dependent variable, hcsd, is the standard deviation of the logarithm of
(1 + years of schooling) for people older than 15 years. We take this variable to be a measure
of inequality in the distribution of human capital.8 In regression (II) the dependent variable,
Q5/Q1, is the ratio of the income of the top quintile to the income of the bottom quintile
in the income distribution. We take this variable to be an alternative measure of inequality
in the distribution of human capital.9 The regressor, ELF, is a measure of the degree of
ethnic diversity. Following William Easterly and Ross Levine (1997) and Alberto Alesina,
Reza Baqir, and Easterly (1997), who suggest that diﬃculties in providing public goods
are attributable to political polarization caused by ethnic diversity, we use ELF as a proxy
for limited ability of producers to enforce a collective choice of the amount of guarding.10
The other regressors, AGR and AGR2, are the fraction of labor force in the agricultural
8The source for hcsd was Jose` De Gregorio and Jong-Wha Lee (1999). We used the observation for the
year 1990.
9The source for Q5/Q1 was Klaus Deininger and Lyn Squire (1996). We used the observation closest
to the year 1990. The use of the Gini coeﬃcient as an alternative proxy measure for inequality in the
distribution of human capital yielded almost identical results.
10ELF is an acronym for ethno-linguistic fractionalization. The source for ELF was Anthony Annett
(1997) and David Barrett (1992), whose data provides a more detailed and more recent breakdown of ethno-
linguistic groups than does the data on ethnic diversity used by Paulo Mauro (1995) and by Easterly and
Levine (1997).
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sector and the square of this fraction. These variables control for the level of economic
development.11 These regressions show positive and statistically signiﬁcant dependence of
both hcsd and Q5/Q1 on ELF. A possible inference from these regressions is that collective
choice of guarding is associated with an egalitarian educational policy, whereas individual
choice of guarding is associated with an elitist educational policy, just as the anecdotal
evidence suggests.12
Our theoretical analysis provides an explanation for these associations. We ﬁnd that, if
producers collectively choose the amount of guarding against predators, then the well en-
dowed people prefer an egalitarian educational policy that increases the human capital of all
of the poorly endowed people and, thereby, decreases the amount of guarding that is neces-
sary to deter poorly endowed people from choosing to be predators. In contrast, if producers
individually choose the amount of guarding against predators, then the well endowed people
prefer an elitist educational policy that, if it has a redistributional component, decreases the
number of poorly endowed people and, thereby, decreases the number of people who choose
to be predators.
1. Analytical Framework
Let K denote the human capital of each well endowed person, and let k denote the
human capital of each poorly endowed person, where K ≥ k > 0. Let U denote the
ratio of poorly endowed people to well endowed people. The fraction of people who are
poorly endowed equals U/(1 +U), and the fraction of people who are well endowed equals
11The source for AGR was World Bank (1993). We used the observation for 1990. Together the positive
coeﬃcient for AGR and the negative coeﬃcient for AGR2 capture the Kuznets curve.
12As additional support for the anecdotal evidence, we found for 14 OECD countries a positive correlation
of 0.5 between ELF and an internationally comparable measure of inequality in human capital, deﬁned
as the diﬀerence between the scores of the 75th percentile and the 25th percentile in each country on an
international test of mathematics and science for primary school students. The source of this measure of
inequality in human capital was OECD (1997).
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1/(1 + U). Aside from their endowments of human capital, people are otherwise identical.
The average endowment of human capital, denoted by Ω, is
Ω =
K + Uk
1 + U
.
Let e, where 0 ≤ e < 1, denote the fraction of his human capital that each well endowed
person allocates to educating people who are initially poorly endowed with human capital.
The variable e captures the redistributional component of publicly ﬁnanced education.13
Assuming that each unit of human capital allocated to education produces one additional
unit of human capital, Ω is related to the average initial endowment of human capital,
denoted by Ωo, according to
Ω = Ωo +
eK
1 + U
.
Equating these two expressions for Ω and rearranging, we can relate (1 − e)K, the
amount of human capital that each well endowed person has available for the production of
consumables, to Ωo, U, and k. Speciﬁcally,
(1) (1− e)K = Ωo + U(Ωo − k).
Equation (1) implies that, for a given value of Ωo, the combination of U and k fully
describes the interpersonal distribution of human capital available for the production of
consumables.14
13This formulation restricts educational policy to be in eﬀect a redistribution of human capital from the
well endowed to the initially poorly endowed. This restriction accords with our concern with whether or not
the initially poorly endowed are “an abandoned underclass”. In a diﬀerent context Raquel Fernandez and
Richard Rogerson (1995) suggest that partial public funding of higher education can involve a redistribution
from poorer to richer people.
14If each unit of human capital allocated to education produces λ additional units of human capital, where
λ is positive but not necessarily equal to one, then equation (1) generalizes to (1−λe)K = Ωo+U(Ωo−k).
All of the qualitative conclusions derived below obtain whether or not λ equals one.
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Given the amount of human capital that he has available for production each person
must choose whether to be a producer or a predator. Let N denote the fraction of people
who are well endowed and who choose to be producers, let n denote the fraction of people
who are poorly endowed and who choose to be producers, and let R denote the ratio of
predators to producers. The fraction of people, whether well endowed or poorly endowed,
who choose to be predators equals R/(1 +R), which is identical to 1−N − n.
If a person chooses to be a producer, then he must allocate his human capital between
production and guarding against predators. Let G denote the ratio of the human capital
that a producer allocates to guarding against predators to the human capital that he allocates
to the production of consumables. The fraction of his human capital that a producer allocates
to guarding equals G/(1+G), and the fraction of his human capital that a producer allocates
to production equals 1/(1 +G).
As discussed above, the choice of G can be made either collectively or individually. Let
G denote the maximum collective choice of G that producers can enforce. The present
analysis takes G to be an exogenous variable. Endogenizing G would be an interesting
extension.
To simplify the analysis of the choice between being a producer or a predator, assume
that a unit of human capital can produce one unit of consumables. The number of units of
consumables that a producer actually produces equals the product of the amount of human
capital that he has available for production and the fraction of this human capital that he
allocates to production. Thus, a well endowed producer produces (1− e)K/(1 +G) units
of consumables, a poorly endowed producer produces k/(1+G) units of consumables, and,
with the same G for all producers, total production equals [N(1−e)K+nk]/(1+G) units
of consumables.
Let p denote the fraction of his production that a producer appropriates. Predators
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appropriate the fraction 1− p.15 It is natural to assume that p depends negatively on the
ratio of predators to producers and positively on a producer’s guarding ratio.16 Speciﬁcally,
assume that
(2) p =
1
1 + θR/G
, where θ ≥ 0.
In equation (2), the parameter θ, which embodies the technology of predation, determines
the eﬀectiveness of predators in appropriating consumables for given values of R and G.
The speciﬁcation that p does not depend on the identity of the predators reﬂects the
assumption that well endowed people and poorly endowed people are equally eﬀective at
predation.17
Let C denote the consumption of a well endowed producer, and let c denote the
consumption of a poorly endowed producer. As a well endowed producer produces (1 −
e)K/(1 + G) units of consumables, and a poorly endowed producer produces k/(1 + G)
15For simplicity the model abstracts from possible destruction of some consumables as the result of pre-
dation. In Grossman and Kim (1995) we show how destruction is easily incorporated into the analysis.
16A random matching story provides a simple rationale for these assumptions. The larger is the ratio of
predators to producers the more frequently will each producer encounter a predator. The larger is the ratio
of resources allocated to guarding against predators to production that has to be guarded the less successful
will the predators be in each encounter.
17Equation (2) assumes, for simplicity, that for each producer p depends only on R and on his own
guarding ratio. We could extend the model to allow for a negative externality in guarding. For example, it
is possible that, if your neighbors build high walls around their properties but you do not build a high wall
around your property, then your property becomes a relatively easier target for burglars. In this case, for
each producer p also would be positively related to his own guarding ratio relative to the guarding ratio
of other producers. It is easy to show that in the case of individual choice of the amount of guarding this
eﬀect would cause each producer to choose a larger guarding ratio for any given value of R. But, because
individual producers take R as given, a negative externality in guarding would not change the conclusion
that in the case of collective choice of the amount of guarding producers, taking into account the deterrent
eﬀect of guarding, would choose to enforce an even larger guarding ratio.
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units of consumables, we have
(3) C =
p(1− e)K
1 +G
and
(4) c =
pk
1 +G
.
Let D denote the consumption of a predator. As total production equals [N(1−e)K+
nk]/(1 + G) units of consumables, assuming that each predator obtains an equal share of
the total amount of consumables appropriated from the producers, we have
(5) D =
1− p
R/(1 +R)
N(1− e)K + nk
1 +G
.
According to equation (5) D is a decreasing function of R. If R equals zero, then the
analysis takes the value of D to be limR→0D, which, using equations (1) and (2), equals
θΩo/G(1 +G).
2. The Choice to be a Producer or a Predator
To decide whether to be a producer or a predator, each well endowed person compares
the values of C and D, both of which he takes as given, and each poorly endowed person
compares the values of c and D, both of which he takes as given. Using equations (1) -
(5) we ﬁnd that the choices of well endowed and poorly endowed people to be producers or
predators depend on G in the following way:18
1. If D equals C but is larger than c, then poorly endowed people prefer to be
predators, whereas well endowed people are indiﬀerent between being producers or
predators. This case would occur if and only if G equals θ. In this case, R can
take any value larger than or equal to U.
18The ratios D/C and D/c are undeﬁned for G smaller than θ.
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2. If D is smaller than C but larger than c, then poorly endowed people prefer to be
predators, whereas well endowed people prefer to be producers. This case could occur
only if G is larger than θ, but smaller than θ(1− e)K/k. In this case, R is equal
to U.
3. If D is smaller than C but equal to c, then poorly endowed people are indiﬀer-
ent between being producers or predators, whereas well endowed people prefer to be
producers. This case could occur only if G is equal to or larger than θΩo/k, but
not larger than θ(1 − e)K/k. In this case, the equality between D and c implies
that R is equal to (G− θΩo/k)/(θΩo/k − θ). This implied value of R is equal to
or smaller than U, but larger than or equal to zero.
4. If D is smaller than both c and C, then every person prefers to be a producer.
This case could occur only if G is larger than θΩo/k. In this case, R equals zero.
Summarizing these results we have
(6) R =


x ∈ [U,∞] if and only if G = θ
U only if θ < G < θ(1− e)K/k
G−θΩo/k
θΩo/k−θ only if θΩo/k ≤ G ≤ θ(1− e)K/k
0 only if G > θΩo/k.
The piecewise linear locus in Figure 1 illustrates equation (6). The next section turns to the
choice of G by producers.
3. The Ratio of Predators to Producers with Unconstrained Collective Choice
of the Amount of Guarding
Consider a country in which the limited ability of producers to enforce a collective choice
of the amount of guarding against predators, as represented by G, does not impose a
binding constraint. In this country the producers collectively choose G to maximize C
and c, as given by equations (3) and (4). This unconstrained collective choice of G takes
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into account both the eﬀect of G on p for a given ratio of predators to producers, as
given by equation (2), and the eﬀect of G on the choices of well endowed people and poorly
endowed people to be predators, as given by equation (6). Because a producer choosing his
amount of guarding individually would not take into account the eﬀect of G on R, the
unconstrained collective choice of G is as large as or larger than producers would choose
individually. Hence, given an unconstrained collective choice of G producers would not
individually choose to allocate any additional human capital to guarding.
Substituting equations (2) and (6) into equations (3) and (4), we ﬁnd that both C and c
have a local maximum at G equal to G∗, where G∗ equals (1+)θ(1−e)K/k, and where
, a small positive number, is the smallest fraction by which the producers collectively can
choose to increase G. From equation (6), G∗ is the minimum value of G that would
result in an equilibrium in which R uniquely equals zero — that is, the minimum value
of G that would surely deter every person, whether well endowed or poorly endowed, from
choosing to be a predator.19 Note that G∗ is positively related to (1− e)K/k.
We also ﬁnd that both C and c can have either one of two other local maxima. One
of these possible local maxima is at G equal to
√
θU, which is the solution to the ﬁrst-
order conditions for an interior maximum, dC/dg = dc/dg = 0, given R = U. The other
possible local maximum is at G equal to (1+ )θ, which is the minimum value of G that
would deter only all of the well endowed people from choosing to be predators. Note that
(1 + )θ is also the value that G∗ approaches as k approaches (1− e)K — that is, as
the interpersonal distribution of human capital becomes more egalitarian.
To determine the global maximum, we compare the values of C and c associated with
G equal to G∗,
√
θU, and (1 + )θ. Substituting equations (2) and (6) into equation (3)
19Equation (6) says that R = 0 could also be associated with values of G such that θ(1 − e)K/k ≥
G > θΩo/k. But, such values of G also can be associated with positive values of R.
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we ﬁnd that the values of C that would result from each of these possible choices of G are
(7) C =


(1− e)K
1 +G∗
for G = G∗
(1− e)K
(1 +
√
θU)2
for G =
√
θU
(1− e)K
(1 + U
1+	
)[1 + (1 + )θ]
for G = (1 + )θ
The values of c that would result from each of these possible choices of G are the same,
except that k replaces (1 − e)K in the numerator of each expression. Given k and U
the producers collectively choose the value of G for which the resulting values of C and
c are largest. Denote the resulting value of C as CJ .
Equation (7) implies that either the smaller is (1− e)K/k or the larger is U the more
likely are the producers collectively to set G equal to G∗ in order to deter all people,
both the poorly endowed as well as the well endowed, from choosing to be predators. The
intuition for this result is that the smaller is (1− e)K/k the smaller is G∗, whereas the
larger is U the larger would be the ratio of predators to producers and the resulting fraction
of production lost to predation if the poorly endowed people were not deterred from choosing
to be predators.
4. Educational Policy With Unconstrained Collective Choice of the Amount of
Guarding
Let ko denote the initial endowment of human capital of an initially poorly endowed
person, let Ko denote the initial endowment of human capital of a well endowed person,
and let Uo denote the ratio of initially poorly endowed people to initially well endowed
people. Equation (1) implies that Ko equals Ωo + Uo(Ωo − ko). To make the problem
interesting assume that initial interpersonal distribution of human capital is such that the
initial ratio of poorly endowed to well endowed people is large and that initially poorly
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endowed people have little human capital relative to the well endowed people. Speciﬁcally,
assume that ko is smaller than Ko
√
θ/Uo and that Uo is larger than θ. Given this
initial interpersonal distribution of human capital both C and c have local maxima at G
equal to (1 + )θKo/ko and at G equal to
√
θUo. Either one or the other of these local
maxima can be the global maximum. Figure 2 illustrates how C depends on G in this
initial situation.
As discussed above, the well endowed people make a collective choice of the fraction of
their human capital to allocate to educating people who are initially poorly endowed with
human capital. In addition, the educational policy that the well endowed people collectively
choose can be either egalitarian, in that it increases the human capital of all of the poorly
endowed people, or elitist, in that, if it has a redistributional component, it only decreases
the number of poorly endowed people, or some combination of egalitarian and elitist. The
objective of the well endowed people is to maximize their own consumption.20
The problem that the well endowed people solve is to choose k and U to maximize CJ ,
the consumption of a well endowed person, as derived from equation (7), subject to k ≥ ko
and U ≤ Uo. The constraints k ≥ ko and U ≤ Uo are consistent with educational policy
being in eﬀect a redistribution of human capital from the well endowed to the initially poorly
endowed. Equation (1) implies that, given Ωo, the choice of k and U also determines
(1− e)K, the amount of human capital that each well endowed person has available for the
production of consumables.
Substituting equation (1) into equation (7) we ﬁnd that, with U larger than θ, the
20For ease of exposition we analyse sequentially the three decisions — the choice of each person to be a
producer or a predator, the choice by producers of the amount of guarding against predators, and the choice
by well endowed people of an educational policy. The equilibrium of our model simultaneously reconciles
these choices. In this equilibrium the consumption of the people with the largest consumption is maximized.
In Grossman and Kim (1999) we use a model similar to the model in the present paper to derive the
distribution of human capital that maximizes the consumption of the person with the smallest consumption.
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maximum value of CJ obtains for G equal to G
∗, the minimum value of G for which R
equal to zero unambiguously obtains, and for k/(1− e)K equal to
√
θ/U. In addition, for
these values of G and k/(1− e)K the maximum value of CJ is a nondecreasing function
of U. Thus, with Uo larger than θ and ko smaller than Ko
√
θ/Uo, the solution to the
problem of maximizing CJ is for the initially well endowed people to leave U unchanged
and equal to Uo, but to increase k, and to decrease (1− e)K, to satisfy
(8) k = (1− e)K
√
θ/Uo.
Increasing k and decreasing (1− e)K decreases G∗.
Given this interpersonal distribution of human capital, the producers collectively choose
(9) G = G∗ = (1 + )
√
θUo.
From equation (9) we see that the assumption that G is not a binding constraint implies
that G is at least as large as (1 + )
√
θUo. (See Mathematical Appendix A for a more
complete derivation of these results.)
This analysis says that, if the limited ability of producers to enforce a collective choice
of the amount of guarding against predators does not impose a binding constraint, then
the well endowed people choose an egalitarian educational policy that increases the human
capital of all of the initially poorly endowed people. Figure 3 illustrates how C depends
on G with this egalitarian educational policy. This educational policy, however, does
not equalize everyone’s human capital, nor does it decrease the fraction of people who are
poorly endowed. Given the interpersonal distribution of human capital that results from
this educational policy, the producers collectively chose enough guarding against predators
to deter everyone from choosing to be a predator.21 In this case, the educational policy
21This implication involves the implicit assumption that every person who is initially poorly endowed with
human capital is suﬃciently educable to be able to achieve the endowment k as given by equation (8).
In reality, it is likely that some people are not suﬃciently educable to achieve this endowment of human
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that the well endowed people choose balances the marginal beneﬁt of decreasing the cost
of deterring predation by increasing the human capital of poorly endowed people with the
marginal cost of increasing the human capital of poorly endowed people.
5. Educational Policy and The Ratio of Predators to Producers with Con-
strained Collective Choice of the Amount of Guarding
Consider another country in which the limited ability of producers to enforce a collective
choice of the amount of guarding against predators, as represented by G, imposes a binding
constraint. Speciﬁcally, assume that G is smaller than (1+ )
√
θUo, which is the choice of
G derived in the preceding section, but also assume that G is at least as large as (1+ )θ.
Recall that (1 + )θ is the minimum value of G that would deter all of the well endowed
people from choosing to be predators, and that it is also the value that G∗ approaches as
k approaches (1 − e)K. In this country the well endowed people collectively choose the
educational policy that maximizes C, given that the producers collectively choose G to
maximize C and c, subject to the constraint G ≤ G.22
Substituting equation (1) into equation (7) we ﬁnd that, with U larger than θ, the
maximum value of CJ , subject to the constraint G ≤ G, obtains for k/(1− e)K equal
to (1 + )θ/G and for G equal to G. With k/(1 − e)K equal to (1 + )θ/G, G is
capital. The choice of G as given by equation (9) would not deter these insuﬃciently educable people from
choosing to be predators. Accordingly, we should not take the implication that everyone is deterred from
predation literally. We should expect that in reality, even with unconstrained collective choice of the amount
of guarding and a educational policy that attempts to increase everyone’s human capital to k as given by
equation (8), some insuﬃciently educable people choose to be predators.
22This assumption implies that, although the limited ability of producers to enforce a collective choice of
the amount of guarding against predators imposes a binding constraint, the well endowed people do not face
a binding constraint on their ability to enforce their collective choice of an educational policy. A possible
rationale for this assumption is that the collective choice of educational policy involves only the well endowed
people, whereas the collective choice of the amount of guarding is more diﬃcult because it involves all of the
producers, who can include poorly endowed people in addition to well endowed people.
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equal to G∗. In addition, for these values of k/(1− e)K and G the maximum value of
CJ is a nondecreasing function of U.
Thus, with Uo is larger than θ and ko smaller than Ko
√
θ/Uo, the solution to the
problem of maximizing CJ is for the well endowed people to leave U unchanged and equal
to Uo, but to increase k, and to decrease (1− e)K, to satisfy
(10) k = (1− e)K(1 + )θ/G.
Given this interpersonal distribution of human capital, the producers collectively choose
(11) G = G = G∗.
(See Mathematical Appendix B for a more complete derivation of these results.)
This analysis says that, given that the limited ability of producers to enforce a collective
choice of the amount of guarding against predators imposes a binding constraint, but that
producers can enforce a collective choice of guarding that is at least large enough to deter all
of the well endowed people from choosing to be predators, the well endowed people choose
an egalitarian educational policy that increases the human capital of all of the initially
poorly endowed people suﬃciently to make it possible, by setting G equal to G, to deter
everyone from choosing to be a predator.23 Given this educational policy, the producers
collectively chose the maximum amount of guarding against predators that they can enforce,
and everyone is deterred from choosing to be a predator, as in the previous case in which G
was not a binding constraint.
23Equation (10) implies that k/(1− e)K is an increasing function of G. As G approaches (1 + )θ,
k/(1− e)K must approach one to make it possible to deter everyone from choosing to be a predator. In this
case the educational policy that the well endowed people choose might come close to equalizing everyone’s
human capital.
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6. The Ratio of Predators to Producers with Individual Choice of the Amount
of Guarding
Finally, consider a country in which G, the maximum collective choice of G that
producers can enforce, is smaller than (1 + )θ. In this country not only is G a binding
constraint, but, as we shall see, G is not larger than the guarding ratio that producers
would choose individually. Hence, in this country the strategic advantage of collective choice
of guarding is lost.
In individually choosing the amount of guarding, each producer takes the choices of other
people to be producers or predators as given. Thus, if a well endowed person chooses to be a
producer, then he chooses G to maximize C, taking R as given, and if a poorly endowed
person were to choose to be a producer, then he would choose G to maximize c, taking
R as given.
To analyse the individual choice of G we substitute equation (2) into equations (3) and
(4) and calculate the value of the ratio G that satisﬁes the conditions dC/dg = 0 and
dc/dg = 0. For both well endowed producers and poorly endowed producers this ratio is
given by
(12) G =
√
θR.
Solving equations (6) and (12) for R, and assuming that the ratio k/Ωo is small relative
to θ, we ﬁnd that the equilibrium ratio of predators to producers with individual choice of
G is
(13) R = max{θ, U}.
Equation (13) says that, if U, the ratio of poorly endowed people to well endowed people,
is equal to or larger than θ, then all of the poorly endowed people choose to be predators,
and all of the well endowed people choose to be producers. Figure 4 illustrates the solution
of equations (6) and (12) for U larger than θ. Alternatively, if U were smaller than θ,
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then all of the poorly endowed people and some of the well endowed people would choose to
be predators. In this equilibrium well endowed people would be indiﬀerent between being
producers and being predators. Figure 5 illustrates the solution of equations (6) and (12)
for U smaller than θ.24
With well endowed people either preferring to be producers or being indiﬀerent between
being producers and being predators the consumption of a well endowed person is equal to
C. Substituting for p from equation (2) and for G and R from equations (12) and (13)
into equation (3), we calculate the equilibrium value of C, denoted CI , to be
(14) CI =


(1− e)K
(1 + θ)2
for U ≤ θ
(1− e)K
(1 +
√
θU)2
for U > θ.
Equation (14), together with equation (1), tells us how CI depends on k and U.
7. Educational Policy Given Individual Choice of the Amount of Guarding
Assume again that the well endowed people make a collective choice of the fraction of
their human capital to allocate to educating people who, because of either modest natural
ability or ineﬀective nurturing or both, are initially poorly endowed with human capital.
With individual choice of the amount of guarding the problem that the well endowed people
24More generally, solving equations (6) and (12) for R would yield
R =


θ for U ≤ θ
U for θ < U ≤ R1
R1 for R1 < U < R2
{R1, R2, U} for U ≥ R2,
where R1 and R2 are the values of R that satisfy both R = (G − θΩo/k)/(θΩo/k − θ), from equation
(6), and G =
√
θR, from equation (12). Such values of R would exist only if k/Ωo were suﬃciently large
relative to θ.
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solve is to choose k and U to maximize CI , as given by equation (14), subject to k ≥ ko
and U ≤ Uo. Assume again that Uo is larger than θ.
Substituting equation (1) into equation (14) we ﬁnd that CI is a decreasing function of
k. This result obtains because increasing k would decrease (1−e)K without aﬀecting R.
Thus, part of the solution to the problem of maximizing CI is for the well endowed people
to leave k unchanged and equal to ko.
We also ﬁnd that, for U smaller than θ, CI is an increasing function of U. This result
obtains because, as R cannot be smaller than θ, making U even smaller that θ would
decrease (1− e)K without aﬀecting R.
Finally, we ﬁnd that, for U larger than θ, CI is a quasi-convex function of U.
Speciﬁcally, CI has a local maximum at U equal to θ, has a local minimum at a value of
U that is larger than θ, and approaches a ﬁnite limit from below as U goes to inﬁnity.
If and only if U equal to θ is not the global maximum, then there exists a value of U,
denoted Uˆ , such that CI evaluated at any value of U larger than Uˆ is larger than CI
evaluated at U equal to θ. (Note that Uˆ , if it exists, is larger than θ.) Figures 6 and 7
depict the relation between CI and U on the assumption that Uˆ exists.
This analysis implies that the other part of the solution to the problem of maximizing
CI may or may not call for the well endowed people to use some of their human capital to
decrease U. If Uˆ exists and if Uo is as large as or larger than Uˆ , as illustrated in Figure
6, then the well endowed people leave U unchanged and equal to Uo. In Figure 6 we see
that decreasing U from Uo could only decrease CI . In this case, the well endowed people
do not choose to use any of their human capital to educate people who are initially poorly
endowed. This result obtains because, with a small fraction of people who are initially well
endowed, a given decrease in U would require that a large fraction of the human capital of
the well endowed people be used for education.
Alternatively, either if Uˆ does not exist or if Uo is smaller than Uˆ , as illustrated
in Figure 7, then to maximize CI the well endowed people decrease U to make U
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equal θ. In Figure 7 we see that U equal to θ would yield the largest value of CI for
all values of U less than or equal to Uo. In this case, the well endowed people choose
to educate some of the initially poorly endowed people suﬃciently to make them also well
endowed, thereby decreasing the fraction of people who are poorly endowed, but leaving
the remaining poorly endowed people with no more than their initial endowment of human
capital. This elitist educational policy reduces R, the ratio of predators to producers,
from Uo to θ. Because of the producers’ limited ability to enforce a collective choice of
the amount of guarding, educational policy is directed towards decreasing the number of
predators rather than facilitating the deterrence of predation.
8. Summary
Assuming that people can choose to be either producers or predators, we have found
that well endowed people can maximize their own consumption by choosing collectively to
use some of their human capital to educate people who, because of modest natural ability
or ineﬀective nurturing or both, are initially poorly endowed with human capital. More im-
portantly, we found that whether the well endowed people choose an egalitarian educational
policy that increases the human capital of all of the poorly endowed people or an elitist
educational policy that, if it has a redistributional component, only decreases the number
of poorly endowed people without increasing the human capital of the remaining poorly en-
dowed people depends on the ability of producers to enforce a collective choice of the amount
of guarding against predators.
We considered three possible cases. In the ﬁrst case, the limited ability of producers to
enforce a collective choice of the amount of guarding does not impose a binding constraint.
In the second case, the limited ability of producers to enforce a collective choice of the
amount of guarding imposes a binding constraint, but this constraint is not tight enough
to negate the strategic advantage of collective choice in taking into account the deterrent
eﬀect of guarding on the number of people who choose to be predators. In the third case,
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the producers’ ability to enforce a collective choice of the amount of guarding is so limited
that the strategic advantage of collective choice is lost.
We found that in the ﬁrst two cases the well endowed people maximize their own con-
sumption by choosing an egalitarian educational policy that by increasing the human capital
of all of the poorly endowed people either decreases the cost of deterring predation or makes
deterrence possible. In contrast, in the third case producers, or small subsets of producers,
individually choose the amount of human capital to allocate to guarding. Importantly, an
individual producer, or small subset of producers, takes the choices of other people to be ei-
ther predators or producers as given, ignoring the deterrent eﬀect of guarding on the number
of people who choose to be predators. We found that in this case the well endowed people
maximize by their own consumption by choosing an elitist educational policy that, if it has
a redistributional component, decreases the number of poorly endowed people and, thereby,
decreases the number of predators.
Applying this theory, we contrast two sets of countries. One set includes Western Euro-
pean countries and some East Asian countries, like Japan, Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan,
that seem to provide historical examples of collective choice of the amount of guarding
against predators, and in which, as a result, the amount of guarding has been suﬃcient to
deter most, if not all, low-skilled predatory activities like burglary, robbery, and kidnapping.
Our theory leads us to expect these countries to have egalitarian educational policies that
provide even relatively poorly endowed people with a good education. The other set includes
countries in South America, Africa, and Asia, including the Philippines, and, perhaps, also
the United States, that seem to provide historical examples of individual choice of the amount
of guarding against predators. Our theory leads us to expect these countries to have elitist
educational policies that give some people an excellent education and other people little or
no eﬀective education. As we have noted, these implications seem to be consistent with the
facts about diﬀerences across countries in educational policy.
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Mathematical Appendices
A. Educational Policy Given Unconstrained Collective Choice of the Amount of
Guarding
Let C∗J denote the global maximum of CJ subject to the constraints ko ≤ k ≤ Ωo
and 0 ≤ U ≤ Uo. We ﬁnd the values of k and U associated with C∗J by comparing the
three possible local maxima, as given by equation (7), each maximized with respect to U
and k.
1. Substituting equation (1) into the ﬁrst row of equation (7), we ﬁnd that the local maximum
for C at G = (1 + )θ(1− e)K/k is maximized with U = Uo and
k = min{
√
1 +  (1 + Uo)
Uo +
√
Uo/θ
, 1} Ωo,
or, equivalently, k/(1− e)K = min{
√
θ/Uo, 1}. The resulting value of C, denoted CI , is
CI =


Ωo
1 + (1 + )θ
for Uo ≤ θ
Ωo(1 + Uo)
(1 +
√
θUo)[1 +
√
(1 + )θUo]
for Uo > θ.
2. Substituting equation (1) into the second row of equation (7), we ﬁnd that the local
maximum of C at G =
√
θU, if it exists, is maximized either with U = (1 + )θ and
k = ko or with U = Uo and k = ko. The resulting value of C, denoted C
II , is either
CII =
[1 + (1 + )θ]Ωo − (1 + )θko
(1 + θ
√
1 + )2
with U = (1 + )θ and k = ko
or
CII =
(1 + Uo)Ωo − Uoko
(1 +
√
θUo)2
with U = Uo and k = ko.
3. Substituting equation (1) into the third row of equation (7), we ﬁnd that the local
maximum of C at G = (1 + )θ, if it exists, is maximized with U = 0. The resulting
maximized value of C, denoted CIII , is CIII = Ωo/[1 + (1 + )θ].
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We can easily see that, if Uo > θ, then C
I > CII and CI > CIII , regardless of
whether CII occurs with U = (1+ )θ or U = Uo. Thus, C
∗
J is associated with U = Uo
and with k and G as given by equations (8) and (9).
B. Educational Policy With Constrained Collective Choice of the Amount of
Guarding
Let CJ denote the global maximum of CJ subject to the constraint G ≤ G and
subject to the constraints ko ≤ k ≤ Ωo, and 0 ≤ U ≤ Uo. Assume that Uo > θ and
(1+)θ ≤ G < (1+)√θUo. Again, we ﬁnd the values of k and U associated with CJ by
comparing the three possible local maxima, as given by equation (7), each maximized with
respect to U and k.
1. Although the value of G associated with the maximization of the ﬁrst row of equation
(7) with respect to U, k, and G does not satisfy the constraint G ≤ G, by substituting
equation (1) into G = (1 + )θ(1 − e)K/k and rewriting the constraint G ≤ G as
(1 + )θ[Ωo + U(Ωo − k)]/k ≤ G, we see that the binding constraint of G can be satisﬁed
at G = (1 + )θ(1 − e)K/k either by decreasing U or by increasing k. Because both
decreasing U and increasing k reduces the value of C at G = (1 + )θ(1− e)K/k from
the unconstrained maximum, the constrained maximum would occur with the constraint
G ≤ G satisﬁed as an equality. Substituting G = G = (1 + )θ(1 − e)K/k into the ﬁrst
row of equation (7), we ﬁnd that, with the constraint G ≤ G satisﬁed as an equality, the
local maximum for C at G = (1 + )θ(1− e)K/k is C = kG/(1 + )θ(1 +G). This local
maximum for C is maximized with the largest value of k that satisﬁes the constraints
U ≤ Uo, k ≤ Ωo, and G = G. Thus, this local maximum for C is maximized with U = Uo
and
k =
(1 + )θ(1 + Uo)Ωo
(1 + )θUo +G
,
or, equivalently, k = (1−e)K(1+ )θ/G >
√
θ/Uo. The resulting value of C, denoted C
I
,
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is
C
I
=
G(1 + Uo)Ωo
(1 +G)[(1 + )θUo +G]
.
2. Similarly, although G =
√
θUo does not satisfy the constraint G ≤ G, this constraint
can be satisﬁed by decreasing U. In this case, because decreasing U decreases the value
of C at G =
√
θU from the unconstrained maximum, the constrained maximum would
occur with the constraint G ≤ G satisﬁed as an equality. The value of G associated with
U = (1+)θ satisﬁes the constraint G ≤ G. Substituting G = G = √θU and equation (1)
into the second row of equation (7), we ﬁnd that, with the constraint G ≤ G satisﬁed as an
equality, the local maximum for C at G =
√
θU is maximized either with U = (1 + )θ
and k = ko or with U = G
2
/θ and k = ko. The resulting value of C, denoted C
II
, is
either
C
II
=
[1 + (1 + )θ]Ωo − (1 + )θko
(1 + θ
√
1 + )2
with U = (1 + )θ and k = ko
or
C
II
=
(1 +G
2
/θ)Ωo −G2ko/θ
(1 +G)2
with U = G
2
/θ and k = ko.
3. The constraint G ≤ G is not binding for the maximization of the local maximum for C
at G = (1 + )θ. As in the previous section, the local maximum for C at G = (1 + )θ,
if it exists, is maximized with U = 0 and CIII = Ωo/[1 + (1 + )θ].
We can easily conﬁrm that C
I
> C
II
and C
I
> CIII , regardless of whether C
II
occurs with U = (1 + )θ or U = G
2
/θ. Thus, CJ is associated with U = Uo and k
and G as given by equations (10) and (11).
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